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Abstract: We discuss two essential problems of the political economy of public finances: 
The principal agent problem between voters and elected politicians and the common pool 
problem arising from the fact that money drawn from a general tax fund is used to pay for 
policies targeting more or less narrow groups in society. Three institutional mechanisms 
exist to deal with these problems, ex-ante rules controlling the behavior of elected policy 
makers, electoral rules creating accountability of and competition among policy makers, 
and budgeting processes internalizing the common pool externality. We review recent 
theoretical and empirical research and discuss its implications for research and institutional 
design.   
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1. Introduction  
The core of public finances is that some people spend other people’s money. In 
democracies, voters delegate the power over public spending and taxes to elected 
politicians. Two aspects of this are particularly important for the conduct of fiscal 
policy. The first is the principal-agent relationship between voters (the principals) 
and politicians (the agents). The second is the common pool problem of public 
finances (von Hagen and Harden, 1996). 
The principal-agent relationship implies that politicians can extract rents from 
being in office. Voters might wish to limit these rents by subjecting politicians to 
strict rules. However, the uncertainty and complexity of economic and political 
developments prohibit the writing of complete contracts. Therefore, the principal-
agent relation resembles an “incomplete contract” leaving politicians with 
considerable residual powers (Seabright, 1996; Persson et al., 1997; Persson and 
Tabellini, 1999a, b, 2000; Tabellini, 2000). The greater these residual powers are, the 
greater will be the divergence between voter preferences and actual policies. This 
basic claim has been tested and confirmed by comparing public finances under 
representative democracy and direct democracy, which gives votes more 
opportunities to express their preferences and more direct control over politicians, 
and, hence less residual powers to politicians (Pommerehne 1978, 1990; Matsusaka 
1995; Kirchgässner et al 1999; Feld and Kirchgässner 1999; Feld and Matsusaka 
2003).  
The common pool problem arises when politicians can spend money from a 
general tax fund on targeted public policies. The fact that the group of those who pay 
for specific targeted policies (the general tax payer) is larger than the group of those 
who benefit from them implies a divergence between the net benefits accruing to the 
targeted groups and the net benefits for society as a whole. This divergence induces 
the targeted groups and the politicians representing them to demand more spending 
on such policies than what is optimal for society as a whole. Thus, the common pool 
problem leads to excessive levels of public spending. Putting the argument into a 
dynamic context, one can show that it also leads to excessive deficits and 
government debts (Velasco 1999, von Hagen and Harden 1996.) This tendency for 
excessive spending, deficits and debt increases with the number of politicians 
drawing on the same general tax fund, a point empirically confirmed by Perotti and 
Kontopoulos (1999). Ideological and ethnic divisions or ethno-linguistic and religious 
fractionalization of societies increase the tendency of people one side to neglect the 
tax burden falling on the other side, making the common pool problem more severe. 
Thus, empirical studies showing that such schisms result in higher spending levels, 
deficits and debt confirm the importance of the common pool problem (Roubini and 
Sachs 1989; Alesina and Perotti 1995; Alesina et al. 1997; Annett 2000).  
The common pool problem also looms large behind vertical fiscal relations within 
countries. Transfers from the central to local governments imply that residents in 
one region benefit from taxes paid by residents in other regions. Bailouts of over-
indebted local governments are a special form of such transfers. Carreaga and 
Weingast (2000) show how vertical transfers distort local decisions towards excess 
spending and a bias in favor of public consumption. The studies collected in Rodden 
et al. (2003) and Fernandez-Arias et al. (forthcoming) confirm the empirical relevance 
of bailouts in many countries.   3
The adverse consequences of the principal-agent problem and the common pool 
problem can be mitigated by institutions governing the decisions over public 
finances. Three types of fiscal institutions are particularly relevant in this context: (1) 
Ex-ante rules such as constitutional limits on deficits, spending or taxes, (2) electoral 
rules fostering political accountability and competition, and (3) procedural rules of 
the budget process. Studying the effects of these three types of fiscal institutions has 
been a very active field of research in the past 15 years, stimulated by the need to 
reign in excessive spending and deficits in OECD and developing countries alike, and 
by the European Union’s desire to find an adequate set of rules governing national 
fiscal policies in its monetary union.  
This chapter reviews and discusses this research on fiscal institutions.  Section 2 
deals with ex-ante rules. Section 3 discusses the roles of electoral institutions. 
Section 4 considers the budget process. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Ex-ante Rules  
We define ex-ante fiscal rules as numerical constraints on certain budgetary 
aggregates. Prominent examples are the balanced-budget constraints, numerical 
debt ceilings, and limits on (the growth of) taxes and spending that exist in almost all 
states of the U.S. and most provinces in Canada, and the numerical debt and deficit 
limits of the European Monetary Union. Historically, such rules were often imposed 
by taxpayers, who were angry about the spending profligacy of their elected 
representatives (Eichengreen and von Hagen 1996, Millar 1997) or rising taxes (Alm 
and Skidmore 1999.) Ex-ante rules are also frequently imposed on sub-national 
governments to protect the central government against the risk of having to bailout 
highly indebted sub-national governments with limited revenue sources of their own 
(von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996).   
There is a fair amount of variation in the scope and strictness of ex-ante rules (see 
ACIR (1987) and Strauch (1998) for the US, Jones et al. (1999) for Argentine 
provinces, Hallerberg et al. (2001) for European countries, and von Hagen and 
Eichengreen (1996) and Stein et al. (1999) for other countries.) At the national level, 
ex-ante fiscal rules remain fairly rare (see Kennedy and Robbins (2001) and Kopits 
(2001)). Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands introduced such rules after 
World War II to enhance the credibility of their macroeconomic stabilization 
programs. In the US, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation of the 1980s is a 
prominent example of an unsuccessful ex-ante rule. Canada and New Zealand 
introduced fiscal rules at the national level in the early 1990s, as did the member 
states of the European Monetary Union. In Switzerland, a constitutional debt limit 
was voted into effect by public referendum in December 2001.   
Ex-ante rules seem straightforward to control politicians and attractive for 
simplicity and transparency. But how successful are they? Empirical evidence 
(Strauch, 1998; Eichengreen, 1990; von Hagen, 1991) suggests that US state 
governments subject to stringent numerical deficit constraints tend to substitute 
debt instruments not covered by the legal rule for the debt instruments that are, 
leaving total debt unaffected. Kiwiet and Szakalay (1996) find that state governments 
subject to more restrictive borrowing constraints tend to substitute municipal debts 
for state debt. Fatas et al. (2003) find that the deficit limits of the European Monetary 
Union did not constrain deficits in the large member states effectively. Wolff and von 
Hagen (2004) show that member states of the European Monetary Union use creative 
accounting to circumvent the deficit limits. In US states, constitutional expenditure   4
limits tend to induce a shift from the (constrained) current budget to the 
(unconstrained) investment budget (Strauch, 1998). Rueben (1997) and Shadbegian 
(1996) find no significant effects of tax and expenditure limits on the level of 
spending in cross-section studies of US states. Controlling for the possible 
endogeneity of the rules, Rueben (1997) finds that the tax burden is slightly lower in 
the presence of tax limits. The key insight from this research is that the effectiveness 
of ex-ante fiscal rules is limited at best, because the rules can be circumvented.   
Furthermore, ex-ante limits on sub-national government deficits and debts can 
create a strategic dilemma for the central government, if the sub-national 
governments do not own a sufficiently strong tax base. Bordignon (2000) shows that, 
in the 1970s and 1980s, Italian local governments frequently overran their budgets 
and turned to the national government for additional transfers, threatening to close 
down critical public services like hospitals and schools otherwise. Knowing that they 
could not borrow for legal reasons and had no tax significant sources of their own, 
the national government had little choice but to give in to their demands. Several of 
the case studies of local government bailouts in Latin America collected in 
Fernandez-Arias et al (forthcoming) describe similar strategic behavior by sub-
national governments. von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) find that central 
government debt ratios tend to be higher in countries where sub-national 
governments are subject to ex-ante borrowing constraints. This suggests that central 
governments accommodate demands from local governments to borrow on their 
behalf, exposing the central government to more financial fragility. 
Several authors have suggested that ex-ante limits on deficits and debts have 
beneficial effects on risk premia contained in government bond yields (Goldstein and 
Woglom 1992; Poterba and Rueben 1999.) However, there may be harmful effects as 
well. Tight balanced-budget constraints may prevent reforms because governments 
cannot smooth their fiscal costs over time. Razin and Sadka (2003) illustrate this 
point in the context of social security reform in an aging society, where the benefits 
and taxes of a pay-as-you-go system must be scaled back to keep the system viable. 
To be acceptable to both the current young and old generations, this reform must be 
financed in part by an increase government debt. With a tight limit on government 
debt, the reform fails to win the required political support. In this case, the fiscal 
rules effectively undermines the financial stability of the government, because it 
focuses too narrowly on current and explicit debt and neglects future fiscal liabilities.  
Poterba (1994) shows that states subject to more stringent numerical limits on 
deficits and debt tend have more pro-cyclical and, hence, less efficient fiscal policies 
and more macroeconomic volatility. In contrast, Fatas and Mihov (2003) find that ex-
ante rules prevent governments from engaging in discretionary policies creating 
unnecessary macroeconomic fluctuations. The result would be more efficient fiscal 
policies and less macroeconomic volatility. Fatas and Mihov (2004) provide 
econometric evidence suggesting that the second effect dominates. Thus, the 
implications of ex-ante rules for macro economic stability remain an open question.     
3. Political Competition and Accountability 
According to the retrospective-voting paradigm, voters use elections to hold 
politicians accountable for past performance. They reappoint incumbents, if they find 
their behavior satisfactory, otherwise, they vote for competing candidates. This 
suggests that rents can be limited by strict accountability and fierce competition. 
Political accountability and competition are determined by the rules governing   5
political elections. Electoral rules are characterized by district magnitude, electoral 
formula, and ballot structure. District magnitude relates to the number of 
representatives elected from each electoral district. Electoral formula translates votes 
into seats. Ballot structure determines how citizens vote, e.g., they cast votes for 
individual candidates or they vote for entire party lists.  
Different combinations of these three characteristics exist and they frequently do 
not conform neatly to stylized prototypes. A few tendencies can be identified, 
however. The combination of small district magnitude, plurality rule and votes cast 
for individual candidates focuses the election on the personal performance of the 
candidates, maximizing personal accountability. In contrast, large district magnitude 
combined with proportional representation and votes cast for party lists focuses the 
election on the average performance of all candidates on the party list and weakens 
personal accountability. Thus, one should expect that the scope for extracting 
political rents from being in office is smaller with small district magnitude, plurality 
rule, and votes cast for individual candidates.  
But electoral rules emphasizing personal accountability also give voters a greater 
opportunity to reward politicians for channeling general tax funds in their direction. 
If individual effort rather than average party effort is rewarded, each politician has a 
greater incentive to fight for policies benefiting his constituency. Furthermore, the 
winner-take-all structure of electoral outcomes under plurality rule implies that the 
minimum winning coalition of voters to gain a majority in parliament is smaller than 
under proportional representation. Plurality rule therefore induces politicians to 
target small but critical constituencies in individual electoral districts by providing 
the local public goods and services they demand. In contrast, proportional 
representation forces political parties to seek the support of broader shares of the 
electorate and,  therefore, induces politicians to favor policies benefiting large groups 
of voters such as general public goods and welfare programs which benefit voters in 
many electoral districts (Persson and Tabellini, 2004a; Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002, 
Lizzeri and Persico, 2001).   
The implications for public finance are threefold. First, by putting a check on rent 
extraction, electoral rules strengthening personal accountability should lead to lower 
levels of public spending. Second, proportional representation should lead to higher 
shares of broad-based welfare programs and general public goods in public spending 
than plurality rule. Third, both proportional representation and plurality rule 
contribute to the common pool problem, although they promote different types of 
targeted policies. As discussed below, the extent to which the common pool problem 
leads to excessive levels of spending, deficits, and debt depends on the design of the 
budget process. This implies that empirical tests of the first two implications should 
control for the prevailing budgetary institutions.  
We now turn to the other aspect, competition. The need to gain a large share of 
votes in a district under plurality rule is an important barrier to entry for small 
parties. Political newcomers find it difficult to challenge incumbent politicians, 
because they need a majority to succeed from the start. In contrast, newcomers can 
win at least a small number of seats in parliament under proportional 
representation. Political competition is, therefore, more intense under the latter 
system, particularly when minimum vote thresholds are low. If contestants use the 
election campaign to identify waste and point to instances of rent-extraction, one can 
expect more intense competition to lead to less waste and smaller rents. Thus, the 
consequences of weaker accountability under proportional representation may be 
compensated by more intense competition.     6
Empirical Evidence 
The preceding discussion implies that detailed characterizations are necessary to 
capture the full details of electoral rules. As a result, one should not expect simple, 
clear-cut results. Some interesting evidence exists nevertheless. Persson and 
Tabellini (2004b) find that, in a panel of 90 democracies, countries with plurality rule 
have smaller governments than countries with proportional representation, and that 
the differences are economically significant. Persson and Tabellini (2003) find that, in 
a panel of 60 democracies, all countries expanded the size of government over the 
1970s and 1980s, but countries with plurality rule experienced lower growth of 
government spending than countries with proportional representation.  
Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003) find that proportional representation is 
associated with higher levels of corruption than plurality rule. If corruption is a 
proxy for rents, this is consistent with the theory. Persson and Tabellini (1999b, 
2004b) and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) also show that governments elected under plurality 
rule are characterized by lower shares of spending on general public goods and 
broad-based welfare programs than those elected under proportional representation.   
Hallerberg (2000) argues that Italy’s electoral reforms of 1994 were an important 
factor enabling the country to meet the fiscal requirements of European Monetary 
Union. Wibbels (2003) finds that, in the 1820s to 1840s, governments of US states 
where political competition was low, had a greater tendency to accumulate large debt 
burdens than governments in more competitive states. Skilling (2001) reports a 
similar finding for a set of OECD countries after World War II. Hallerberg and Marier 
(2004) study a sample of Latina American states and find that the common pool 
problem is more relevant in countries whose electoral rules focus on personal 
accountability. In sum, while the existing evidence is scant, it supports the view that 
electoral rules have important consequences for public spending.    
4. Limiting the Common Pool Problem: The 
Budget Process  
At the heart of the common-pool problem of public finances is an externality that 
results from using general tax funds to finance targeted public policies. Individual 
politicians perceive that an increase in spending on targeted policies will provide 
their constituencies with more public services at only a fraction of the total cost. The 
resulting spending and deficit biases can be reduced by inducing politicians to take a 
comprehensive view of the costs and benefits of their decisions. This is the main role 
of the budget process in our context. The budget process consists of the formal and 
informal rules governing budgetary decisions of the executive and legislative 
branches of government. A centralized budget process contains elements that induce 
decision makers to internalize the common pool externality by taking a 
comprehensive view of their decisions. A fragmented budget process fails to do that.   
In this context, centralization refers to the internal organization rather than the 
geographical structure of budgetary decisions. Centralization of the budget process 
requires that all conflicts between competing claims on public finances are resolved 
within its scope. Four deviations from this principle result in fragmentation. The first 
is the use of off-budget funds allowing policy makers to make financial decisions 
without being challenged by conflicting distributional interests. The second are non-
decisions, which make budgetary expenditures dependent on developments 
exogenous to the budget process, such as the indexation of spending programs and   7
open-ended welfare appropriations. Non-decisions degrade the budget process to a 
mere forecast of exogenous developments. The third deviation occurs when non-
financial laws can make certain government expenditures compulsory, which implies 
that budgetary decisions are made outside the budget process.  The fourth deviation 
results from unreported contingent liabilities such as guarantees for the liabilities of 
public or private enterprises or financial institutions. Contingent liabilities imply that 
the ex-post distribution of public funds can differ significantly from the distribution 
negotiated in the budget process.   
Transparency is another important prerequisite of centralization. It requires that 
the budget documents are comprehensive and that expenditures are clearly 
attributed to the relevant spending making units within the government. Lack of 
transparency creates opportunities for collusion among self-interested policy makers 
and prevents decision makers from developing a comprehensive view of the 
consequences of their decisions.  
Budget processes can be proximately divided into four stages, each involving 
different actors with different roles. The executive planning stage involves the drafting 
of the budget by the executive. The legislative approval stage includes the process of 
parliamentary amendments to the budget proposal, which may involve more than 
one house of parliament. The executive implementation stage covers the fiscal year to 
which the budget law applies. The ex-post accountability stage involves a review of 
the final budget documents by a court of auditors or a similar institution checking 
their consistency with the legal authorization.  
Reviewing budget processes in Europe, the US, Latin America and Asia reveals 
that centralization follows two basic approaches. The first is centralization based on 
delegation, the second is centralization based on contracts.   
With delegation, the rules of the executive planning stage of the budget process 
lend special authority to a central agent who determines the broad parameters of the 
budget and enforces them using selective punishments for defecting spending 
ministers. Typically this agent is the finance minister, who can be expected to take 
the most comprehensive view of the budget among all members of the executive, and, 
therefore, to internalize the common pool externality.  At the legislative approval 
stage, the delegation approach lends large agenda-setting powers to the executive. At 
the implementation stage, centralization requires that the central agent be able to 
monitor and control the flow of expenditures during the year, to prevent spending 
departments from overspending their appropriations. Furthermore, centralization 
puts tight limits on any changes in the budget law during the fiscal year and limits 
the use of supplementary budgets.   
In contrast, the contract approach emphasizes binding budgetary agreements on a 
set of fiscal targets negotiated among all members of the executive at the onset of the 
executive planning stage. Here, the bargaining process serves as a mechanism to 
internalize the common pool externality. In practice, the targets are often derived 
from medium-term fiscal programs or coalition agreements among the ruling parties. 
The finance ministry’s role under this approach is to evaluate the consistency of the 
individual departments’ spending plans with these limits. Thus, the finance minister 
has information advantages but no extra strategic powers. At the legislative stage, 
the contract approach places more weight on the role of the legislature monitoring 
the faithful implementation of the fiscal targets and less on controlling parliamentary 
amendments.  At the implementation stage, finally, the contract approach resembles 
the delegation approach in that it requires strong monitoring and control powers of 
the finance minister.     8
It is quite obvious that the delegation approach relies on hierarchical structures 
within the executive, and between the executive and the legislature, while the 
contract approach builds on a more even distribution of authorities in government. 
In democratic settings, hierarchical structures typically prevail within political 
parties, while relations between parties are more even. This suggests that the 
institutional choice between the two approaches depends on the number of parties in 
government. Delegation is appropriate for single-party governments, while the 
contracts approach is appropriate for multi-party coalition governments (Hallerberg 
and von Hagen 1999). There are two reasons behind this conjecture.  
First, the delegation of strategic powers to the finance minister would create a new 
principal agent problem for coalition governments. Cabinet members are likely to 
have very different views on spending priorities and the finance minister could abuse 
any special powers he has to promote the political interests of his own party at the 
cost of others. This problem does not arise in one-party governments, where 
spending ministers can be reasonably sure that the finance minister shares their 
basic spending preferences.   
Second, delegation and contracts use different enforcement mechanisms. Under 
delegation, the ultimate punishment for a defecting spending minister is his 
dismissal from office. This punishment is heavy for the individual, but light for the 
government as a whole. It can be used, if the prime minister has the authority to 
select and replace cabinet members, which is typically not true in coalition 
governments. Breaking up the coalition is the ultimate punishment in coalition 
governments. This punishment is heavy for the entire coalition. Finally, commitment 
to fiscal targets is per-se much less credible for one-party governments, who can 
always walk away from the targets with no further consequences.  
These different enforcement mechanisms also explain the different relations 
between the executive and the legislature. When a single ruling party enjoys a 
majority in parliament, the main concern of the legislative stage is to limit the scope 
of defections from the budget proposals by individual members of parliament. This 
can be achieved by limiting the scope of parliamentary amendments to the budget 
proposal. With multi-party coalitions, in contrast, each party involved in the coalition 
will want to watch carefully that the executive sticks to the coalition agreement.   
Therefore, the contract approach typically vests the legislature with more information 
rights and stronger amendment power than the delegation approach (Hallerberg et 
al. 2001). 
Elections based on plurality rule promote the emergence of two-party systems and 
one-party majority governments (Duverger, 1954; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989, 
1993.) In contrast, proportional representation is consistently characterized by 
multi-party coalition governments (Lijphart, 1984, 1994; Taagepera and Shugart 
1989, 1993). This suggests that countries are more likely to opt for the contract 
approach, if their elections are based on proportional representation (and low 
thresholds), while they are more likely to opt for delegation, if their elections based 
on plurality rule. Hallerberg and von Hagen (1998) and Hallerberg et al (2001) test 
and confirm this hypothesis for the European Union states. Thus, different electoral 
rules demand different institutional solutions to the common pool problem.  
In presidential systems of government, the president does not rely directly on the 
legislature for his position as leader of the executive. Voters can, and often do, 
support a president from one party while denying his party a majority in the 
legislature. The role of the executive in the budget process is not much different in 
presidential systems. Since the president typically appoints the members of his 
administration—with confirmation by the legislature where applicable—the structure   9
of the administration lends itself more to a delegation approach than to a contract 
approach to centralizing the budget process. The relationship between the president 
and the legislature, however, is often more difficult, since the two are conceived to be 
more equal political institutions than in parliamentary forms of governments.  
As a result, centralization of the budget process in presidential systems 
emphasizes two institutional dimensions. One is the internal organization of the 
legislature. Here, centralization can be achieved by creating a strong leadership in 
parliament, through an elevated position of the speaker and through a hierarchical 
committee structure. The other dimension regards the relation between the executive 
and the legislature. The more the constitution puts the two institutions on an equal 
footing, the more budget agreements between the two must rely on the contract 
approach. 
Empirical Evidence 
The hypothesis that centralization of the budget process leads to lower 
government deficits and debts has been confirmed empirically in very different 
geographical and political settings. Von Hagen (1992a) provides evidence from 12 
European Union countries showing a significant negative association between the 
centralization of the budget process and general government deficits and debts 
relative to GDP. Von Hagen and Harden (1994b) extend and broaden the analysis 
and confirm the hypothesis that centralization of the budget process is associated 
with smaller deficits and debts. De Haan and Sturm (1994) work with EU data and 
show that the hypothesis holds up empirically even when a number of political 
factors such as the composition and stability of governments is controlled for. 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1998, 1999)  use panel data for 15 EU countries and 
show that centralization of the budget process goes along with smaller annual 
budget deficits even when controlling for a number of economic determinants of the 
budget deficit and other political variables. Country studies for Belgium (Stienlet 
2000), Sweden (Molander 2000) and Germany (Strauch and von Hagen 1999) point 
to the importance of centralization in achieving (or, in the case of Germany losing) 
fiscal discipline. 
Gleich (2002) studies the budget processes in 10 Central and East European 
countries, an interesting sample since a budget process in the proper sense did not 
exist under the socialist regime. All ten countries hold elections under various forms 
of proportional representation. Gleich shows that centralization conforms to the 
contract approach in these countries and that there is a strong negative association 
between the degree of centralization of the budget process and the public sector 
deficits and debts that emerged in the second half of the 1990s. His results are 
largely confirmed by Yläoutinen (2004a,b). 
Alesina et al (1999) and Stein et al. (1999) use panel data from Latin America to 
show that centralization of the budget process goes along with lower government 
deficits. Jones et al. (1999) analyze Argentine provinces and confirm the same 
hypothesis. Lao-Araya (1997) provides similar results for 11 Asian countries. Strauch 
(1998) uses data from the 50 US state governments to show that centralization 
significantly reduces annual budget deficits. Finally, Strauch (1998) and Gleich 
(2002) show that centralization of the budget process is also associated with smaller 
levels of government spending, as the common pool argument suggests. Other 
empirical studies, however, have failed to confirm this aspect of the theory. A 
suggestive explanation is that the common pool problem implies that actual 
spending exceeds its efficient level, and that controlling for differences in the efficient   10
level of spending is more difficult in cross-country studies than in the context of US 
state governments or the Central and East European countries. 
 The possible endogeneity of institutions is an interesting and important issue in 
this context. Historical experience suggests that governments make efforts to 
centralize the budget process to overcome sharp fiscal crises. Relevant examples are 
France in the 1950s (Wildavsky, 1986) and Sweden in the 1990s (Molander, 2000). 
Studying the imposition of line-item vetos in US state governments, De Figueiredo 
(2003) finds that fiscal conservatives strengthen the role of the executive in the 
budget process when they anticipate losing control over the legislature to fiscal 
liberals. Gleich and von Hagen (2002) find that states in Central and East Europe 
characterized by greater social cleavages have adopted more centralized budget 
processes. This suggests that legislatures were willing to relinquish powers 
anticipating that budgeting would be plagued by the consequences of severe common 
pool problems otherwise. Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2001) find that the 
choice between the delegation and the contracts approach to centralization among 
EU states confirms their prediction that the former is more adequate for single-party 
majority governments, while the latter is more adequate for coalition governments. 
Hallerberg (2004), in a study of EU countries since 1973, argues that countries with 
more intense political competition are more likely to adopt institutions that address 
the common pool problem. All these studies indicate that institutional design 
responds to political factors and circumstances. More work is necessary to 
understand this interaction better.    
5. Conclusions 
The political economy of fiscal institutions has emerged as a fascinating and lively 
field of academic research in the last decade. Insights and implications of this 
research are of considerable practical relevance as they touch on important 
questions of the design and reform of constitutions, governments, and executive 
processes.  
The research reviewed in this chapter takes the principal-agent relationship 
between the voter and the politicians and the common-pool property of public funds 
as the starting points. It strongly suggests that institutional design matters for fiscal 
performance. It also suggests that different political and constitutional environments 
demand different institutional solutions to these problems. More research is needed 
to explore this avenue. Furthermore, the research reviewed here has considered 
fiscal institutions of different kinds. Constitutional aspects such as electoral rules or 
the degree of political decentralization seem to be more fundamental than budgetary 
processes, but the latter should not be ignored. Future research into the fiscal effects 
of constitutions should pay more attention to controlling for the effects of these 
lower-level institutions. Furthermore, more research is needed on the endogeneity of 
constitutional aspects and how the factors than impinge on them affect the 
effectiveness of lower-level institutions.   
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